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NOTES 
Giving the Green Light to Silicon Alley 
Employees: No-Compete Agreements 
between Internet Companies and 
Employees under New York Law 
Dan Messeloff* 
INTRODUCTION 
Once upon a time, in a small neighborhood in London, there 
lived a baker named Mr. Reynolds.  One day, a man named Mr. 
Mitchel approached Mr. Reynolds and offered to rent Mr. 
Reynolds’ bakery from him.  Mr. Reynolds agreed to rent the 
bakery to Mr. Mitchel for five years, and promised not to work as a 
baker in the area during that time, so as not to take customers away 
from Mr. Mitchel.  If Mr. Reynolds broke the contract and opened 
a bakery nearby, he would have to pay Mr. Mitchel fifty pounds.  
Shortly after Mr. Mitchel began running the bakery, Mr. Reynolds 
did indeed open another bakery in the area.  Mr. Mitchel sued Mr. 
Reynolds for fifty pounds, arguing that Mr. Reynolds had broken 
their agreement.  Mr. Reynolds claimed in response that the 
contract was illegal, since he had been trained to be a baker, and 
the law should not prevent him from working as one.1 
Continuing the story, the judge found that the contract between 
Mr. Mitchel and Mr. Reynolds was in fact valid.  “Where a 
contract for restraint of trade appears to be made upon a good and 
adequate consideration so as to make it a proper and useful 
contract, it is good,” wrote Judge Macclesfield.2 “[V]olenti no fit 
injuria, a man may, upon a valuable consideration, by his own 
consent, and for his own profit, give over his trade; and part with it 
 
 *  Washington University, B.A., 1996; Fordham University, J.D. 2001.  The author 
wishes to thank Michael Fraser Stoer for his assistance in this endeavor. 
 1 See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q. B. 1711). 
 2 Id. at 349. 
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to another in a particular place.”3  Because of the agreement he had 
signed with Mr. Mitchel, and because he received money in 
exchange for the use of his bakery, Mr. Reynolds had to comply 
with the contract.4  Since he broke the agreement, Mr. Reynolds 
had to pay the fifty pounds.5 
In his opinion, Judge Macclesfield discussed similar contracts, 
ones made in employment agreements (as opposed to business 
transactions, such as in Mr. Mitchel’s case).6  While the court had 
upheld the contract between Mr. Mitchel and Mr. Reynolds, it 
stated that it would not necessarily do so if it had been made 
between an employer and an employee.7  Such restraints, 
commonly referred to as no-compete agreements,8 are subject to 
“great abuses” by employers, who are “perpetually labouring for 
exclusive advantage in trade, and to reduce it into as few hands as 
possible.”9  More specifically, the court seemed wary of those 
employers “who are apt to give their apprentices much vexation on 
this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure such 
bonds from them,” to protect themselves from competition when 
their employees “set up for themselves.”10  In this light, the court 
held that, while the agreement binding Mr. Reynolds was valid, 
“[i]n all restraints of trade, where nothing more appears, the law 
presumes them bad;” only “if the circumstances are set forth, that 
presumption is excluded, and the Court is to judge of those 
circumstances accordingly; and if upon them it appears to be a just 
and honest contract, it ought to be maintained.”11 
Within the tale of Mr. Mitchel and Mr. Reynolds lie the common 
law origins of restrictive covenants and the modern no-compete 
agreement. A no-compete agreement, normally contained within a 
general employment contract, states that the employee shall not 
work for a competitor or, similar to the agreement between Mr. 
Reynolds and Mr. Mitchel, shall not set up a competitive business 
 
 3 Id. 
 4 See id. at 352. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See id. at 350. 
 7 See id. at 352. 
 8 “No-compete agreements” have also been referred to as noncompete agreements, 
noncompetition agreements, and agreements not to compete. 
 9 Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 350. 
 10 Id. at 352. 
 11 Id. 
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for a specified period of time in a specified geographical area.12 
Balancing the competing interests of employers and employees, 
modern courts have deliberated the same factors and concerns as 
were expressed in Mitchel.13  Indeed, the case offers one of the first 
applications of the “rule of reason” to restraints of trade, even if it 
was at a time when competition beyond a local scale such as a 
neighborhood was inconceivable.14 One commentator has 
suggested that, “[w]ith Mitchel, the essential theory of employment 
covenants was largely completed,”15 while another said that 
“[t]here is very little in the modern approach to the problem for 
which a basis cannot be found in Macclesfield’s opinion.”16 Thus, 
if only in terms of the judicial consideration of no-compete 
agreements, little has changed since 1711. Little, that is, until now. 
In several recent cases in New York involving the enforcement 
of restrictive covenants by Internet companies, the criteria 
previously used for determining the validity of a no-compete 
agreement, together with a more detailed version of the rule of 
reason established in Mitchel, have been questioned.17 The rapid 
rate of progress and technological development on the Internet has 
prompted courts to reevaluate the appropriate duration of no-
compete agreements; a twelve-month period, for example, 
normally considered to be a reasonable term for a no-compete 
agreement in traditional industries, is an “eternity” online.18 
Similarly, because the Internet has no territorial boundaries, any 
purely geographic restrictions would be “all-or-nothing:”19 under 
the traditional requirements, the “geographical area” of the Internet 
 
 12 Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 
626 (1960). 
 13 Id. at 627. 
 14 Id. at 630. 
 15 Mark Glick, et al., Post-Employment Covenants in Utah: A Unified Framework 
Using Law and Economics, available at http://www.econ.utah.edu/les/PostEmp_ 
Glick.htm. 
 16 Blake, supra note 12, at 630-31. 
 17 See Earthweb v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); DoubleClick v. 
Henderson, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 7, 1997). 
 18 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d, at 316. 
 19 Blake has argued that the decline in significance to the courts of geographic 
boundaries with respect to no-compete agreements has been gradual. See Blake, supra 
note 12, at 675. (quoting “Thus, in the modern cases the ‘time’ dimension remains 
critical, but the ‘activity’ restraint is, in many cases, replacing the ‘area’ restraint. 
Restraints mainly concerned with protecting confidential information are likely to be 
inadequate if they contain any geographic limitation; markets and competition are 
increasingly national, even international, in scope.”). 
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(in the words of Judge Macclesfield) would demand that an 
employee be restricted from working for any company doing 
business on the Internet.  Alternatively, because of the staggering 
growth of e-commerce and the proliferation of businesses going 
online, and thus the severe burden upon an employee prevented 
from working for another Internet company, it is possible that such 
an employee could not be restricted from working for any Internet 
company at all.20  This Hobson’s choice risks inequitability for 
both employees and employers. 
In response to this problem, courts – and legislatures – both in 
New York and around the country have been called upon to 
delineate what, if any, temporal, territorial, or other boundaries 
might exist online.21  Ultimately, courts are likely to continue to 
apply an analysis similar to that which they have always used in 
determining whether no-compete agreements are enforceable.22  In 
one narrow respect, therefore, these recent cases illustrate the 
judicial distaste, if only heightened,  for no-compete agreements.  
Whether in the “brick and mortar” world or online; the Internet 
context may necessitate only slightly different outcomes than 
might occur within traditional industries.23  In broader terms, 
 
 20 See Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d, at 306 (referring to comparisons between some 
Internet companies as “ephemeral”). 
 21 Some states have elected to address the issue through their respective legislatures, 
others through the judiciary. Therefore, different jurisdictions weigh the competing 
interests inherent in no-compete agreements differently. California, for example, takes a 
very restrictive approach. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, 16600-01 (1997). “Only where 
the interest sought to be protected would be recognized by the law of unfair competition, 
e.g., trade secrets or other proprietary rights, would a covenant not to compete be allowed 
and only to the extent necessary to protect these special interests;”  Benjamin Aaron and 
Matthew Finkin, The Duty of Loyalty: The Law of Employee Loyalty in the United States, 
20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 321 (1999); see, e.g.,  Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal 
Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980).  South Dakota, on the other hand, has made 
a broad legislative provision for covenants not to compete.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
53-9-11 (Michie 1990). Under South Dakota law, so long as the statutory conditions are 
met, no examination of the “reasonableness” of the covenant is required for employees 
who voluntarily quit or are discharged for cause.  The generally prevailing view, 
however, is that a covenant not to compete will be enforced if it is supported by 
consideration, is justified by a legitimate interest of the employer, and is reasonable in the 
restrictions it imposes on what the employee may do, where (or for whom) and for how 
long in light of the employer’s interest, the employee’s interest, and the public interest.  
See Aaron, Duty of Loyalty, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. at 325.  For a complete 
analysis of the jurisdictional holdings of each of the fifty states, consult COVENANTS NOT 
TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian Malsberger, ed.) (2nd ed. 1996 and 
1998 Cumulative Supplement). 
 22 See, e.g., Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 316. 
 23 Id. at 313, 316. 
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however, these cases promote the growing notion that the Internet 
warrants a modification, if not a complete reassessment, of not just 
employment law or business law, but of traditional legal principles 
as a whole.  Part I of this Note reviews the judicial treatment of no-
compete agreements historically, from common law through the 
current New York law.  Part II analyzes Earthweb v. Schlack,24 a 
federal case decided in the Southern District of New York 
involving a no-compete agreement between an Internet company 
and one of its employees.  Part III of this Note speculates as to the 
applicability of Earthweb, both specifically with respect to no-
compete agreements and employment law, and generally with 
respect to the effect the unique characteristics of the Internet will 
have on other cases and on law as a whole. 
I. A SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND LEGAL HISTORY OF NO-COMPETE 
AGREEMENTS 
Traditionally, as originally discussed in Mitchel v. Reynolds, no-
compete agreements represented a meeting of two contrasting 
policies: the protection of “the uninhibited flow of services, talent, 
and ideas,” as manifested by employee mobility and which resulted 
in the ability of employees to serve society, and, on the other hand, 
the recognized right of employers to secure the legitimate fruits of 
their toil and money.25  The law pertaining to restrictive covenants 
has been influenced by many diverse factors, including the Black 
Death, which decimated the European population, and thus the 
European work force, in the 14th century, and the rise of craft 
guilds in the 15th and 16th centuries.26  As a result of the Black 
Death in 1348 and the resultant reduced labor supply, each 
employee became critical to the continued operation of society.27  
To maintain the proper functioning of society, courts were 
compelled to secure for every “master” or “journeyman” the ability 
to pursue his trade without restriction.28 
 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Reed, Roberts Assoc. v.  John J. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 308 (1976). 
 26 See MALSBERGER, supra note 21, at 155-57. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. 
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A. Restrictive Covenants at Common Law 
From the earliest reported cases, courts have leaned towards 
protection of the rights of the employee.  Indeed, the first known 
case of a restraint of trade occurred in 1414, centuries before even 
Mitchel, by which point “old and settled law” had been established 
in the matter.29  In The Dyer’s Case,30 a dyer had covenanted not to 
practice his trade in London for two years.  Writing for the court, 
Mr. Justice Hull found that the agreement was against public 
policy, against common law, and against the common good: “per 
Dieu, si le plaintiff fuit icy, il irra al prison, tanque il ust fait fyne 
au Roye” (“by God, if the plaintiff was here, he should go to prison 
till he had paid a fine to the King”).31  From this case two 
fundamental common-law principles emerged: (1) all available 
skilled labor had to be kept in the public domain, and (2) an 
individual had a right to earn a livelihood.32 
Other cases have produced more illuminating analyses, if not 
more indignant outcries, for the general judicial reluctance to 
enforce no-compete agreements.33  At common law, each 
individual was held to possess a valuable commodity, or at least a 
potentially valuable commodity, in his ability to apply a learned 
skill for the common benefit of society; to hinder the application of 
this skill was to undermine the interests of society, not to mention 
jeopardize the livelihood and subsistence of the bound party and 
his family.34  “[T]he law abhors idleness, the mother of all evils . . . 
and especially in young men, who ought in their youth (which is 
their seed time) to learn lawful sciences and trades, which are 
profitable to the commonwealth, and whereof they might reap the 
fruit in old age.”35 At common law, restrictive covenants such as 
no-compete agreements were interpreted as a restraint upon the 
potential for society as a whole.  “[I]t is contrary to public policy 
and inimical to the best interests of men and the welfare of society, 
that any one should bind himself generally not to engage in a 
 
 29 The Dyer’s Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, pl. 26 (1414). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See MALSBERGER, supra note 21, at 157. 
 33 See generally David L. Gregory, Courts in New York Will Enforce Non-Compete 
Clauses In Contracts Only If They Are Carefully Contoured, 72 N.Y. ST. B.J. 27 (2000). 
 34 See James Kerr, Contracts In Restraint of Trade, 22 AMER. L. REV. 873 (1888). 
 35 Case of Tailors of Ipswich, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1219 (K.B. 1614). 
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legitimate profession, or carry on his lawful trade or business.”36  
Due to the existing social and economic circumstances, from the 
earliest decisions on record, no-compete agreements were viewed 
with judicial disfavor.37 
Nevertheless, in spite of the harm no-compete agreements posed 
to both individuals and to society at large, there were certain 
undeniable, indispensable benefits arising from restrictive 
covenants.  “Self-protection is the first law of nature and of 
nations, and paramount to all others,” one early commentator 
noted.38  Indeed, when properly constructed, no-compete 
agreements prevent industry from undermining itself: 
A merchant or manufacturer would soon find a rival 
in every one of his servants if he could not prevent 
them from using to his prejudice the knowledge 
they acquired in his employ. Engagements of this 
sort between masters and servants are not injurious 
restraints of trade, but securities necessary for those 
who engage it. The effect of such contracts is to 
encourage rather than cramp the employment of 
capital in trade and the promotion of industry.39 
Without the enforcement of no-compete agreements, businesses 
would be unable to afford the stimulation of research and improved 
business methods, nor could they achieve the freedom of 
communication necessary for a company to operate efficiently.40  
A company has a legitimate interest against unfair practices by an 
employee or another company that might lure the employee in 
order to gain an unfair advantage over the original employer.41  A 
company has a natural right to defend itself against “deliberate 
surreptitious commercial piracy,” and to “safeguard[] that which 
has made [the] business successful.”42 
 
 36 Kerr, supra note 34, at 857-76 (emphasis omitted). 
 37 See generally Tracy L. Staid, The Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements 
When Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating The Analysis, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & 
EMPLOYMENT POLY’ J. 95 (1995). 
 38 Kerr, supra note 34, at 874. 
 39 Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322, 327 (1825). 
 40 See Blake, supra note 12, at 627. 
 41 Joseph Bachelder III, Restrictive Covenants: ‘BDO Seidman’ Case, N.Y. L.J., 
Aug. 30, 1999 at 3. 
 42 Reed Roberts Assoc. v.  John J. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 308 (1976). 
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Other significant socio-economic bases for restrictive covenants 
justify their appeal to and frequent use by employers.  In a service-
driven economy, for example, the ability of an employer to protect 
its investment in human resources, customer relationships, and 
confidential business information – the focal elements of a valid 
no-compete agreement – is critical to ensuring the company’s 
continued economic viability.43  No-compete agreements protect 
the employer’s interests in such investments by preventing former 
employees from entering into competitive employment and 
otherwise eroding the former employer’s market share.44  These 
restraints safeguard interests not protected by trade secret, patent, 
or copyright statutes, and serve to enhance those protections by 
supplying contractual remedies to which an employer might not 
otherwise be entitled.45  “The growth in use of such covenants also 
represents a sound response to increased levels of employee 
mobility, the globalization of product markets, and rapid advances 
in technology.”46  With the comfort and security of no-compete 
agreements, employers can be more confident that valuable 
information imparted to their employees will not be used against 
them later in a competitive endeavor.47 
Historically, until the end of the nineteenth century, both English 
and American courts regarded Mitchel as the seminal authority in 
cases involving restrictive covenants and no-compete 
agreements.48  As the respective societies became more capitalistic, 
however, their courts began adopting more flexible requirements – 
the central concern became whether the contract at issue was fair 
and reasonable, not whether the transaction involved actual 
consideration, as necessary under strict contract law.49  With the 
twentieth century and the peak of the Industrial Revolution came a 
wider variety of jobs and a wider range of circumstances 
surrounding employment.  Unprecedented mergers and industrial 
growth led to fierce rivalries between competing companies, each 
of which might have been both limited to and protected previously 
by local markets.50  Indeed, the Industrial Revolution 
 
 43 See MALSBERGER, supra note 21, at ix. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. at ix-x. 
 48 See Blake, supra note 12, at 630-631. 
 49 See Glick, et al., supra note 15. 
 50 Blake, supra note 12, at 638. 
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foreshadowed the current “Internet Revolution,” in terms of “new” 
employer-employee relationships and the balance of rights 
contained therein: 
Men had become more mobile geographically; to 
leave one’s town no longer involved the economic 
risks and actual physical dangers of an earlier 
period. Local roots were less strong; hostility to 
strangers less of a factor. On the other hand, 
operations were larger, personal relationships 
between master and servant were less important and 
the employee was more completely dependent on 
his vocation for his livelihood than ever before.51 
 With the sweeping changes in employment trends caused by the 
Industrial Revolution, the appropriateness of certain elements of 
the rule of reason test formulated in Mitchel demanded 
reconsideration in light of the varied cases which were beginning 
to emerge.52  With changes to technology came changes to industry 
and to the economy, which in the nineteenth century warranted 
shifts in the balance of power within the employer-employee 
relationship.53  The Industrial Revolution thus posed the first real 
challenge to the judicial attitude towards no-compete agreements. 
Instead of protecting employers from expanding markets and 
increasingly encroaching competitors, however, the Industrial 
Revolution led American courts to place even more emphasis on 
protecting employees and even less on technical contract terms.54  
The earliest cases in New York involving restrictive covenants 
declared that restraints which covered the entire state were invalid 
without any consideration at all as to the circumstances in which 
the agreement was made.55  The courts premised their respective 
holdings in their “regard for the interests of the public in 
unmonopolized, untrammeled commerce, trade, and the arts, and in 
having as many possible industrious citizens engaged in 
contributing their quota to the aggregate productions of the 
 
 51 Id. at 638-39. 
 52 See id. at 637-39. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. at 639-40. 
 55 See Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851); Dunlop v. Gregory, 
10 N.Y. 241 (1851). 
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community.”56  Any agreement that prevented an individual from 
engaging in practicing his occupation within the boundaries of the 
entire state “exact[ed] more territory from the obligor than [was] 
essential to the protection of the obligee,” and was held uniformly 
invalid.57 
In the first case involving a restrictive covenant before the 
United States Supreme Court, however, the Court found that a 
consistent rule as to the appropriate geographic boundaries for 
restrictive covenants was not so clear.58  In Oregon Steam v. 
Winsor,59 a navigation company sold a steamship to another 
company, on the condition that the purchasing company not use 
the ship in California waters for ten years.60  Oregon Steam 
involved a business transaction similar to Mitchel, and the terms of 
the transaction were similarly upheld.61  The Supreme Court 
echoed the English rule of reason test, establishing it as the legal 
standard for the enforcement of no-compete agreements in the 
United States.62 Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, reiterated 
Macclesfield’s holding, that “[i]n order that it may not be 
unreasonable, the restraint imposed must not be larger than is 
required for the necessary protection of the party with whom the 
contract is made.”63  The restraint at issue was found to be 
necessary to protect the former company from interference with its 
own business64 – it did not unreasonably restrict the interests of the 
purchasing company, nor did it “deprive the country of any 
industrial agency.”65  The restraint “involved no transfer of 
residence or allegiance on the part of the vendee in order to pursue 
its employment, nor any cessation or diminution of its business 
whatever.”66  The agreement was presumed to be beneficial to both 
parties to the contract, and was therefore upheld.67 
 
 
 56 See Lawrence, 10 Barb. at 641. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. 64, 67-68 (1873). 
 59 See id. 
 60 Id. at 65. 
 61 Id. at 65, 71-72; see also Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). 
 62 Oregon Steam, 87 U.S. at 66-67. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 71-72. 
 65 Id. at 69. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
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While the rule of reason survived from England to the United 
States, Justice Bradley noted in the Oregon Steam decision that 
certain considerations with respect to no-compete agreements were 
indeed different in the United States than they had been in 
England. The rigid rule in terms of state boundaries as interpreted 
by New York courts was held to be erroneous, as the unique 
territory comprising the United States made the application of the 
rule of reason far more difficult than an understanding of it:68 
In this country especially, where State lines 
interpose such a slight barrier to social and business 
intercourse, it is often difficult to decide whether a 
contract not to exercise a particular trade in a 
particular State is, or is not, the rule. It has generally 
been held to be so, on the ground that it would 
compel a man thus bound to transfer his residence 
and allegiance to another State in order to pursue 
his avocation . . . This country is substantially one 
country, especially in all matters of trade and 
business.69 
 So long as a restrictive covenant contained specific territorial 
boundaries, and did not include the country as a whole, the Court 
would refuse to construe the contract as void.70  In contrast to New 
York’s earlier holding, state boundaries alone were no obstacle to 
the conduct of business, and therefore, to restrict a company from 
engaging in business within an entire state was not necessarily 
unreasonable.71  Nevertheless, “[t]he point of difficulty in these 
cases is to determine what is a reasonable distance within which 
the prohibitory stipulation may lawfully have effect.”72  Thus, in 
the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to address no-compete 
agreements, it confessed that a functional determination on the 
matter of reasonable geographic boundaries for such contract could 
be quite complex.73 
The first major case in New York to follow  Oregon Steam yet 
again found guidance in Mitchel.  Similar to both Mitchel and 
 
 68 Oregon Steam Navigation Co., 87 U.S. at 67. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 67-69. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 68. 
 73 Id. 
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Oregon Steam, in Diamond Match v. Roeber,74 the New York 
Court of Appeals upheld the agreement specifically at issue, a 
restrictive covenant prohibiting the purchaser’s right to 
manufacture matches throughout the United States, “except for 
Nevada and Montana.”75  “We are unwilling to say that the 
doctrine as to what is a general restraint of trade depends upon 
state lines, and we cannot say that the exception of Nevada and 
Montana was colorable merely.”76  In spite of the curious 
restriction, the purchaser had entered the agreement willingly and 
supported by good consideration, “presumably because he 
considered it for his advantage to make the sale.”77  With that 
understanding, the court refused to invalidate what it perceived the 
contracting parties had considered to be a reasonable agreement.78 
Nevertheless, the court cautioned against excessive enforcement 
of no-compete agreements between employers and employees, 
alluding to both the rule of reason and recalling the “mischief[s]” 
that arose from such restraints.79  The court identified damage from 
such covenants “(1) to the party, by the loss, by the obligor, of his 
livelihood and the subsistence of his family; and (2) to the public, 
by depriving it of a useful member and by enabling corporations to 
gain control of the trade of the Kingdom.”80  The court expanded 
even further the judicial sensitivity towards employees that began 
with Mitchel and had been developed by the Supreme Court in 
Oregon Steam, citing geographic, technological, and perhaps most 
importantly, socio-economic changes: 
Steam and electricity have, for the purposes of trade 
and commerce, almost annihilated distance, and the 
whole world is now a mart for the distribution of the 
products of industry. The great diffusion of wealth 
and the restless activity of mankind striving to 
better their condition has greatly enlarged the field 
of human enterprise and created a vast number of 
new industries, which give scope to ingenuity and 
employment for capital and labor. The laws no 
 
 74 106 N.Y. 473 (1887). 
 75 Id. at 478. 
 76 Id. at 485. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 357-48. 
 80 Diamond Match, 106 N.Y. at 481. 
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longer favor the granting of exclusive privileges, 
and, to a great extent, business corporations are 
practically partnerships and may be organized by 
any persons who desire to unite their capital or skill 
in business, leaving a free field to all others who 
desire for the same or similar purposes to clothe 
themselves with a corporate character.81 
 For the blossoming New York economy, and that of the United 
States, to achieve its full potential, no-compete agreements had no 
choice but to bow to public policy and the greater interests of 
society, as nineteenth-century America could not afford to be 
“trammeled by unnecessary restrictions.”82 
B. Establishing a Modern Standard Under New York Law 
In 1932, the Restatement of Contracts proposed a uniform test 
for the enforceability of restrictive covenants.83  The original 
Restatement stated that such a restraint would be held reasonable 
only if “it (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the 
employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, 
and (3) is not injurious to the public.”84  The original version was 
adopted, largely intact, by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
in 1979, which stated: 
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that 
imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise 
valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in 
restraint of trade if; 
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect 
the promisee’s legitimate interest, or  
 
 
 81 Id. The language in Diamond Match suggests that the Internet, or more 
specifically, the potential for sweeping and comprehensive growth which the Internet 
carries, might not be as novel to American society or to the American judiciary as some 
proponents contend. 
 82 Id. at 482. 
 83 RESTATMENT OF CONTRACTS § 515 (1932). 
 84 This is an adaptation of the Restatement’s more general formulation to 
postemployment restraints, typical of those found in cases. See Blake, supra note 12, at 
648-49 and n.79. 
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(b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the 
hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to 
the public.85 
 A restraint would be reasonable only if it was no greater than 
that required for the protection of the employer, does not impose 
undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the 
public.86  The Restatement version was adopted in part under New 
York law by the Court of Appeals in Reed Roberts Associates, Inc. 
v. Strauman,87 in which the court established the modern guideline 
under New York law for the enforceability of no-compete 
agreements. 
In Reed Roberts, the plaintiff-employer sought to prevent a 
former employee from competing against it and soliciting its 
customers.88  In its decision, the court first discussed restrictive 
covenants as a whole, following the pattern of Mitchel, Oregon 
Steam, and Diamond Match.89  The court held that, under New 
York law, covenants restricting competition were only enforceable 
“to the extent that they satisfy the overriding requirement of 
reasonableness,” a standard which varied with the circumstances in 
which the covenant was issued.90  Thus, where a business was sold, 
restrictive covenants would be upheld more strictly with respect to 
time, scope and extent.91  In such cases, the anticompetitive 
measures were “designed to protect the goodwill integral to the 
business from usurpation by the former owner while at the same 
time allowing an owner to profit from the goodwill which he may 
have spent years creating.”92  It was this “goodwill” that had been 
protected by the court in Mitchel over 350 years earlier. 
In discussing no-compete agreements between employers and 
employees, the court in Reed Roberts followed the precedent 
established in Mitchel, one in which a “stricter” standard of 
reasonableness, one even more sympathetic towards employees, 
 
 85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §187 (1979). 
 86 For a complete discussion of the differences between the two Restatements, see 
Milton Handler and Daniel Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669 (1982). 
 87 40 N.Y.2d 303 (1976). 
 88 Id. at 305-06. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 307-08. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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would be used.93  The “undoubted judicial disfavor” towards no-
compete agreements was justified by “powerful considerations of 
public policy which militate against sanctioning the loss of a man’s 
livelihood.”94  The view of at the time was that the economy of 
New York and in the United States resulted directly from “the 
uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas,” and that no contract 
should bind an employee to prevent him from “apply[ing] to his 
own best advantage” the valuable skills obtained through previous 
employment.95 
Echoing the Restatement, the court in Reed Roberts held that “a 
restrictive covenant will only be subject to specific enforcement to 
the extent that it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to 
protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to the 
general public and not unreasonably burdensome to the 
employee.”96  To temper its deference to a free and unfettered 
market, the court recognized the “legitimate” rights and interests of 
employers in securing the confidentiality of employees through no-
compete agreements.97  These interests included protection from 
“the disclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential customer 
information,” such as customer lists, each of which amounts to 
“deliberate surreptitious commercial piracy.”98  Where the 
employee’s knowledge did not qualify for protection as a trade 
secret, however, and where there was no evidence of a breach of 
the employer’s trust, the court found no reason “to inhibit the 
employee’s ability to realize his potential both professionally and 
financially by availing himself of opportunity.”99  The test as 
formulated in Reed Roberts has become the modern standard under 
New York law.100 
In a more recent case, BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg,101 the New 
York Court of Appeals applied the traditional test to no-compete 
agreements between “professionals,” in this case, accountants.102  
 
 93 Reed Roberts, 40 N.Y.2d at 307-08. 
 94 Id. (citations omitted). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 308. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Reed Roberts, 40 N.Y.2d at 309. 
 100 Id. 
 101 93 N.Y.2d 382 (1999). 
 102 Id. at 389-90. 
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In BDO Seidman, the court reiterated the “modern, prevailing 
common-law standard” for the enforceability of no-compete 
agreements as established in Reed Roberts: A no-compete 
agreement will be enforced to the extent that it is reasonable in 
time and area, necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate 
interests, not harmful to the general public, and not unreasonably 
burdensome to the employee.103  The court ruled, however, that a 
legitimate employer interest included protection from “exploiting 
or appropriating the goodwill of a client or customer, which had 
been created and maintained at the employer’s expense, to the 
employer’s competitive detriment.”104  In addition to trade secrets 
and customer lists, the court in BDO Seidman held that a 
company’s investment in customer relationships and in goodwill 
warranted protection as well.  The goodwill which had previously 
been protected only in sale of business contracts was recognized as 
a legitimate employer interest to be protected in no-compete 
agreements between employers and employees.  Furthermore, 
while Reed Roberts was the general test to be applied, employers 
were entitled to special protection against “professionals,” former 
employees who expose the employer “to special harm because of 
the unique nature of the employee’s services.”105 This factor 
emerged as the “unique or extraordinary services” exception to the 
traditional enforcement of no-compete agreements.  The burden of 
proof in the enforcement of a no-compete agreement now shifted 
in part: Under BDO Seidman, an employer must show that the 
employee threatened the interests of the employer, or alternatively, 
that the employee possessed “unique or extraordinary” skills or 
services, the use of which for a new employer would alone 
undermine the former employer’s interests. 106 
In sum, under New York law, a no-compete agreement will 
generally be enforced if it is (1) reasonably limited in terms of 
scope and duration, and (2) narrowly tailored to the employer’s 
legitimate interests, which include protection of its trade secrets or 
other confidential information, or if the employee’s services are 
“unique or extraordinary.”107  This formulation allows for “fair and 
reasonable counterbalancing provisions” on behalf of both the 
 
 103 Id. at 388-89. 
 104 Id. at 389. 
 105 See Lumex v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 106 Id. at 628; see also BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 389. 
 107 BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 389. 
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employer and the employee.108  The threshold issues are therefore 
twofold: First, whether the no-compete agreement is reasonable as 
to “duration, territory and scope of proscribed activity,” and 
second, whether the agreement serves a “legitimate” purpose – i.e., 
something other than preventing talented employees from going to 
work for a competitor.109  Only if a no-compete agreement 
comports with these terms will it be enforced under New York law. 
II. NO-COMPETE AGREEMENTS AND THE INTERNET:            
EARTHWEB V. SCHLACK 
“Turn on, tune in, interface:” A fitting motto for the twenty-first 
century and the Internet Revolution.110  According to recent 
studies, there were approximately 332.7 million Internet users as of 
June, 2000,111 with more than 18 million new users every 
month,112 and a projected 700 million users expected by the end of 
2001.113  “E-commerce,” business transactions taking place over 
the Internet, is expected to reach $1.1 trillion by 2002.114  In a mere 
twenty years, the Internet has transformed itself from a government 
and university research project into the ultimate “hangout for the 
masses.”115  One example of the Internet’s influence is the $165 
billion merger between America Online and Time Warner.  The 
transaction was widely recognized as the absorption of the latter, 
the nation’s largest media and entertainment company with $15 
billion in sales in 1999, by the former, the nation’s largest Internet 
company, whose stock shares have increased over 59,000 percent 
since it went public in March, 1992.116  The New York Times 
called the deal “the first (though hardly the last) consummated 
marriage between new media and old;”117  whereas the Wall Street 
 
 108 Lumex, 919 F. Supp., at 636. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Gina Maranto, Tune In, Turn On, Interface, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1994, Sec. 7, at 
38. 
 111 Masaaki Suzuki, Analysis: IT Infrastructure Needed to Bridge Digital Divide, THE 
DAILY YOMIURI, July 26, 2000 at 12. (citing report of NUA, a company that specializes in 
publishing worldwide statistics). 
 112 CES Notebook, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Jan. 11, 1999. 
 113 Agence France-Presse, U.N. Fears Divisive Impact of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 29, 2000 at A16. 
 114 CES Notebook, supra note 112. 
 115 Maranto, supra note 110. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Frank Rich, Two 21st Century Foxes Elope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000 at A17. 
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Journal called it “the death of old media.”118  Like Time Warner, 
traditional companies around the globe have found themselves 
facing an ultimatum: “[A]dapt to the new rules, or risk being left 
aside.”119  By the time it is complete, the Internet Revolution is 
expected to have an unparalleled influence on the world, requiring 
only two or three decades to achieve far more than the Industrial 
Revolution accomplished in two or three centuries.120 
With respect to no-compete agreements, because the Internet has 
had – and will continue to have – such a tremendous impact on the 
economy as a whole and on specific companies individually, it has 
also had an enormous impact on employment trends and employee 
mobility.121  Coupled with, or perhaps a result of, the robust 
American and global economy it helped to cultivate, the Internet 
has fostered a general mentality of employee mobility.  According 
to one analyst, “[p]eople who try new opportunities aren’t 
necessarily seen as job hoppers anymore, but rather as risk 
takers.”122  Typical employees in Silicon Valley, for example, will 
have worked in 10 different jobs by the time they are 45 years 
old.123  In the United States, the expected increase in information-
science-related jobs is 118 percent by 2006, while the number of 
graduates planning to go into information science is expected to 
increase by only 4 percent.124 Employees in certain Internet-related 
industries have thus become “more akin to rock stars than to 
regular employees,” as they are highly sought-after and therefore 
have significant leverage in the employer-employee relationship.125  
“Intellectual capital is becoming the battleground between budding 
entrepreneurs and organisations.  The pendulum has swung 
towards the creators, many of whom want to own the intellectual 
rights to their work, but that’s being fiercely resisted by 
organisations of intergalactic value, which want control over the 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Alex Berenson and Bill Carter, When Everything New Becomes Dizzyingly Newer, 
N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000 at C1. 
 120 CES Notebook, supra note 112. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Richard Ream, Changing Jobs? It’s a Changing Market, INFORMATION TODAY, 
Feb. 1, 2000 at 18. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Margaret Coles, IT Stars Use Courts to Cast Off Chains, SUNDAY TIMES (London), 
Dec. 5 1999. 
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ideas.”126  As a result, no-compete agreements are becoming an 
area of increasing concern for Internet companies engaged in this 
struggle, since, particularly with the recent market decline,  
“you’re going to see a lot of employers start to try enforcing those 
noncompetes.’”127 
A. Earthweb v. Schlack: The Southern District Goes Online 
In light of recent trends in both the economy and employee 
mobility, Mark Schlack is not exceptional.  It is precisely because 
Mark Schlack is not exceptional that the issue of no-compete 
agreements on the Internet, contracts between Internet companies 
and their employees, is so critical to the Internet Revolution.128   
Mark Schlack had worked in the publishing industry for sixteen 
years before joining an Internet company called Earthweb.129  
Earthweb provided online products and services to information 
technology (IT) professionals through a number of websites 
containing articles and other training materials, periodicals, books, 
downloads, and other resources tailored to IT professionals.130 
Schlack was responsible for the editorial content of all of 
Earthweb’s websites, and was given the title of Vice President, 
Worldwide Content.131  Schlack was one of ten vice presidents 
within the company, in addition to two senior vice presidents, an 
executive vice president, and the chief executive officer.132  
Schlack began his employment with Earthweb in October 1998.133 
When Schlack began working at Earthweb, he signed an 
employment agreement containing several sections, one of which 
was a no-compete agreement. The first section of the contract 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 John Shyer and Blair Connelly, Dot-Com Noncompete Agreements Enforceable?, 
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 2000 at S5 (citation omitted). 
 128 See Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial 
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128 and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
575 (suggesting that “[p]ostemployment covenants not to compete have the potential to 
restrict seriously the movement of employees between existing firms and to start-ups and, 
hence, to restrict seriously employee-transmitted knowledge spillovers”). 
 129 Earthweb v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 130 Id. at 302-03. 
 131 Id. at 303. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
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stated that Schlack’s employment was “at will,”134 meaning that 
the relationship “may be severed at any time by either party 
without cause.”135 The third section contained an “encyclopedic” 
definition of “inventions,” which was incorporated into the 
subsequent section concerning non-disclosure of proprietary 
information.136  Under the fourth section, Schlack was  prohibited, 
both during and after his term of employment, from disclosing or 
using any “Confidential Information,” unless requested to do so.137  
Under Earthweb’s definition, such information included: 
[A]ll proprietary information, technical data, trade 
secrets, and know-how, including, without 
limitation, research, product plans, customer lists, 
markets, software, developments, inventions, 
discoveries, processes, formulas, algorithms, 
technology, designs, drawings, marketing and other 
plans, business strategies and financial data and 
information, including but not limited to Inventions, 
whether or not market as ‘Confidential.’138 
 In spite of what might have been a genuine attempt at protecting 
information it had hoped to keep confidential, Earthweb’s 
definition of “Confidential Information” restricted Schlack from 
utilizing far more than mere confidential information. 
 
 134 Id. at 306. 
 135 BLACK’S LEGAL DICTIONARY 525 (7th ed. 1999). 
 136 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 306-07. Section Three defined “Inventions” as: 
[A]ll ideas, potential marketing and sales relationships, inventions, 
copyrightable expression, research, plans for products or services, 
business development strategies, marketing plans, computer software 
(including, without limitation, source code), computer program, 
original works of authorship, characters, know-how, trade secrets, 
information, data, developments, discoveries, improvements, 
modifications, technology, algorithms and designs, whether or not 
subject to patent or copyright protection, made, conceived, expressed, 
developed, or actually or constructively reduced to practice by 
[Schlack] solely or jointly with others during the terms of [Schlack’s] 
employment with Earthweb, which refer to, are suggested by, or 
result from any work which [Schlack] may do during 
his . . . employment, or from any information obtained from 
Earthweb or any affiliate of Earthweb, such that said information is 
obtained in the performance of duties related to employment at 
Earthweb. 
Id.  
 137 Id. at 307. 
 138 Id. 
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The fifth section of Schlack’s employment agreement contained 
a no-compete agreement, or a “Limited Agreement Not to 
Compete.”139  Schlack could not “directly or indirectly” work in 
any capacity “for any person or entity that directly competes with 
Earthweb” for a period of twelve months.140  A “directly 
competing entity” included: 
(i) an on-line service for Information 
Professionals whose primary business is to provide 
Information Technology Professionals with a 
directory of third party technology, software, and/or 
developer resources; and/or an online reference 
library, and/or 
(ii) an on-line store, the primary purpose of which 
is to sell or distribute third party software or 
products used for Internet site or software 
development.141 
 Under the terms and conditions of this employment agreement, 
containing fourteen sections over five pages, Mark Schlack began 
his employment with Earthweb. 
On Sept. 22, 1999, after less than a year with Earthweb, Schlack 
left to join ITworld.com, a website owned and operated by 
International Data Group, Inc. (IDG), which was scheduled to 
launch in January, 2000.142  According to Earthweb, IDG is the 
world’s leading provider of IT print-based information with over 
$1 billion in annual revenues, mainly through its publication of 
 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Under New York law, a trade secret is determined through consideration of the 
following: 
(1) the extent to which the information is know outside of the 
business; 
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved 
in the business; 
(3) the extent of measures taken by the business to guard the secrecy 
of the information; 
(4) the value of the information to the business and its competitors; 
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the business in 
developing the information, [and] 
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be 
properly acquired or duplicated by others. 
Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (citation omitted). 
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more than 280 monthly periodicals.143  IDG planned to consolidate 
four of its on-line IT publications, along with three other wholly-
owned websites, into a single website, ITworld.com, which would 
be available to IT professionals for news, opinions and product 
information.144  In contrast to Earthweb’s focus on products and 
services of third parties, ITworld.com would rely on its own 
internal staff of more than 275 journalists.145  Shortly after Schlack 
tendered his resignation, however, Earthweb sought a preliminary 
injunction in federal court to prevent Schlack from “disclosing or 
revealing Earthweb’s trade secrets to IDG or any third parties.”146 
In order to enforce its no-compete agreement through a 
preliminary injunction, Earthweb had to establish “(1) irreparable 
harm or injury, and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the 
merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to 
make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships 
tipping decidedly in [Earthweb’s] favor.”147  In New York, 
irreparable harm may be demonstrated by a showing of 
misappropriation of trade secrets by an employee. “A trade secret, 
once lost, is lost forever; its loss cannot be measured in money 
damages.”148 Alternatively, Earthweb could show irreparable harm 
through the “inevitable disclosure” of trade secrets by the 
employee, normally used when an employee will join a company 
in direct competition with the original employer, and the employee 
possesses highly confidential or technical knowledge.149  The 
theory behind the doctrine of inevitable disclosure is akin to “a 
coach, one of whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the 
opposing team before the big game.”150  Similar to restrictive 
covenants, however, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure is 
generally frowned upon by the judiciary, except under the most 
exceptional circumstances.151  Therefore, if Schlack did not 
misappropriate any of Earthweb’s trade secrets, any injunctive 
relief for Earthweb against Schlack would have to be found within 
the no-compete agreement contained in Schlack’s employment 
 
 143 Id. at 303. 
 144 Id. at 306. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 302. 
 147 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 308. 
 148 Id. (citation omitted). 
 149 Id. at 309. 
 150 Id. (citation omitted). 
 151 Id. at 310. 
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agreement.152 
In its preliminary analysis of the employment contract between 
Earthweb and Schlack, the court found various terms problematic, 
several of which resembled the “mischiefs” condemned in 
Mitchel.153  First, the employment offered by Earthweb to Schlack 
was “at will,” which meant that Earthweb could terminate Schlack 
without cause and with no penalty for doing so, and yet it made no 
provision for any severance payment to Schlack.154  Earthweb had 
even reserved the unilateral right to modify the terms of its 
agreement with Schlack.155  Before considering the details of the 
no-compete agreement specifically, the court indicated that the 
contract which Earthweb had offered to Schlack seemed 
“onerous[ly]” overbroad, and tended to inhibit fair competition 
rather than protect the confidential information it feared Schlack 
might disclose.156  The court concluded that, collectively, under the 
terms of his employment contract, Schlack seemed not so much 
employed by Earthweb as he was “indenture[d]” to it.157 
To justify the strict terms within the employment contract it had 
extended to Schlack, Earthweb argued that Schlack had been 
exposed to certain trade secrets while with the company, and that 
such terms were necessary and legitimate for Earthweb’s 
protection.158  Schlack contested the extent to which he had access 
to any trade secrets, as well as his value to the company and the 
potential harm to Earthweb caused by his departure.159 Earthweb 
argued that Schlack was “one of its most important officers,” and 
that, without the enforcement of its no-compete agreement, he 
would divulge important trade secrets.160  Schlack asserted that 
Earthweb had inflated the nature of his position with the company, 
and that his position with IDG was sufficiently different that he 
would have no occasion to disclose anything he might have learned 
from his position with Earthweb.161  The two parties also disputed 
 
 152 Id. 
 153 See Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348. 
 154 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id. at 307-08. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
 161 Id. 
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the extent to which Schlack had exposure to Earthweb’s 
confidential information or trade secrets, namely, the company’s 
strategic content planning and Schlack’s technical knowledge of 
Earthweb’s operations.162 
With respect to strategic planning, Earthweb alleged that 
Schlack knew “the specific target audience for each website, how 
Earthweb aggregated content on those websites to reach the 
targeted audience, and how Earthweb may intend to improve the 
content and delivery of particular websites.”163  Schlack responded 
that, while he did have significant involvement in Earthweb’s 
editorial development, he had little if any interaction with senior 
management, and therefore knew little about any overall business 
goals.164  Schlack also asserted that any incidental information he 
might have known about Earthweb’s strategic planning would soon 
be obsolete, as the company’s websites were constantly 
changing.165  The only other confidential information at issue was 
Schlack’s technical knowledge of Earthweb’s operations. While 
Schlack had no access to Earthweb’s source codes or configuration 
files, Schlack was allegedly aware of Earthweb’s “trial and error 
process” in implementing the services of outside consultants. 
Earthweb feared that Schlack would use this knowledge to 
Earthweb’s detriment by solving similar technical problems at 
ITworld.com thereby allowing ITworld.com to avoid the mistakes 
and pitfalls that had befallen Earthweb.166  In all, Earthweb alleged 
that Schlack’s knowledge, in aggregate, constituted confidential 
information which deserved protection as a trade secret, and that 
he should be enjoined from working for any competing Internet 
company.167 
The court determined that, as is likely at most Internet start-ups 
and other small companies, Mark Schlack did have access to 
information concerning a wide range of matters, some sensitive 
and confidential and some not.168  Schlack did work in 
collaboration with other employees on matters relating to 
 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 304. 
 164 Id. at 305. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 305. 
 167 Id. at 307-08. 
 168 Id. 
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Earthweb’s technology, marketing and advertising.169  Although 
not directly responsible for such areas, Schlack’s decisions relating 
to Earthweb’s editorial content directly impacted these aspects of 
Earthweb’s business, and it was unsurprising that Schlack’s input 
was in fact regarded by Earthweb as “essential.”170  Nevertheless, 
the court doubted whether Schlack’s level of input permitted him 
access to the type of information traditionally afforded trade secret 
protection.171  Schlack had not been involved in developing or 
planning Earthweb’s business strategies or goals, nor did he have 
access to financial reports or information, categories of 
information normally considered confidential and deserving of 
protection.172  Furthermore, the court found that, given the “fluid 
and ever-expanding world of the Internet,”173 any claims of 
confidentiality with respect to strategic planning were dubious, as 
such information was immediately and instantaneously revealed to 
the public upon a website’s launch.174 
In its analysis of Schlack’s duties to Earthweb, the court found 
that while the nature of Schlack’s position did in fact offer him a 
broad perspective over Earthweb’s day-to-day operations, in many 
important respects, his access to highly confidential information 
was limited.”175  Schlack’s only contact with what the court might 
have considered confidential information in such cases – 
“advertiser list[s], source codes, or configuration files” - was 
incidental.176  His editorial responsibilities did not place him within 
the “requisite proximity” to trade secret information, nor did it 
warrant restricting Schlack from pursuing employment with 
another Internet company such as ITworld.com.177 
Earthweb also pressed the position that, under the doctrine of 
“inevitable disclosure,” Schlack might “unintentionally” reveal his 
knowledge of the company’s trade secrets.178  Under this principle, 
“a person in possession of trade secrets, when working on a similar 
 
 169 Id. at 315. 
 170 Id. at 305. 
 171 Id. at 316. 
 172 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 305. 
 173 Id. at 302. 
 174 Id. at 315. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 316. 
 178 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 316. 
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project, may ‘inevitably disclose’ the proprietary information and 
techniques of which he is in possession.”179  Earthweb raised as an 
example Lumex Inc. v. Highsmith,180 a case in which the district 
court found a risk of inevitable disclosure based on both the 
employee’s access to highly sensitive information, and that the 
industry in question, the health fitness industry, was a “‘copy cat’ 
or cloning industry.”181  Nevertheless, the court in Earthweb 
understood the company’s proposed application of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine as “an implied-in-fact restrictive covenant,” 
which, like express restrictive covenants, ran counter to public 
policy.182  “[I]n its purest form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
treads an exceedingly narrow path through judicially disfavored 
territory.”183  Because of the “onerous” terms of Schlack’s 
employment agreement, the court refused to expand the terms of 
the agreement even further on Earthweb’s behalf.  “Earthweb 
[cannot] make an end-run around the agreement by asserting the 
doctrine of inevitable disclosure as an independent basis for 
relief.”184  If Earthweb was entitled to a preliminary injunction 
barring Schlack from working for another Internet company, such 
relief would have to be found within the restrictive covenant it 
drafted, namely, the no-compete agreement. 
The court then examined the specific no-compete agreement 
contained within Schlack’s employment contract with Earthweb.185  
Because Schlack was restricted through the terms of the agreement 
from working for a company whose “primary business” directly 
competed with Earthweb, the construal of ITworld.com’s purpose 
would contribute significantly to whether the agreement would be 
enforced.  The company said that ITworld.com would be in direct 
competition with Earthweb, based on Earthweb’s interpretation of 
ITworld.com’s “‘mission’ memorandum,” and its analysis of the 
websites that IDG had hired Schlack to integrate.186  Alternatively, 
Schlack argued that the “limited” no-compete agreement did not 
apply to ITworld.com, because that company’s “primary business” 
 
 179 Id. (quoting Delphine Software Intern. v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 1999 WL 627413, 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999). 
 180 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 181 Id. at 629. 
 182 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 310. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 311. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 306. 
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was neither “a directory of third party technology,” an “online 
reference library,” nor an “online store,” similar to Earthweb.187  
Instead, ITworld.com’s primary focus would be to publish news, 
analysis, and product information generated by its own editorial 
staff.188 Furthermore, although both Earthweb and ITworld.com 
targeted IT professionals, Schlack argued that Earthweb’s products 
and services were aimed at programmers and technicians, while 
ITworld.com targeted upper-level executives, such as technology 
managers and chief information officers.189  Earthweb countered 
that, as an Internet start-up company, ITworld.com’s “primary 
business” could change in the interim months preceding its launch, 
at which point it would be possible for ITworld.com to “directly 
compete” with Earthweb.190  The unique capacity with which an 
Internet company could change its “primary business,” however, 
worked to Earthweb’s detriment: In order to obtain the preliminary 
injunction it sought, the court reiterated that Earthweb had to 
demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm “now,” and not at 
some point in the future.191 
Towards that end, the court found that any comparison between 
Earthweb and ITworld.com, or between many Internet companies 
for that matter, might ultimately prove to be “ephemeral.”192  In 
consideration of the Internet Revolution, the court confessed its 
difficulty in assessing the characteristics of ITworld.com, “an 
embryonic business entity that will compete in a nascent industry 
which is evolving and re-inventing itself with breathtaking 
speed.”193  Supported by Earthweb’s plans for “constant chang[e]” 
to its own websites, the court could not discern ITworld.com’s 
purpose from its “‘mission’ memorandum,” calling it a “visionary 
outline” and nothing the court could grasp to “transform . . . the 
idea of [ITworld.com] into a perceptible reality.”194  Because any 
Internet company is likely to begin with nothing more than 
ITworld.com’s “architecture, content, and marketing strategy,” the 
court could not reach the determination that such an entity would 
 
 187 Id. at 312. 
 188 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 312. 
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 193 Id. at 312. 
 194 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 312. 
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“directly compete” with Earthweb.195 
In reaching his conclusion, Judge Pauley relied in part upon 
another case, DoubleClick v. Henderson,196 for guidance in dealing 
with restrictive covenants between employers and employees on 
the Internet.  Ironically, the district court in DoubleClick declined 
to address the enforceability of the specific no-compete agreement 
involved in that case.197  Nevertheless, the DoubleClick decision 
does shed light on the use of restrictive covenants, such as no-
compete agreements, by Internet companies.   
The defendants in DoubleClick were two senior executives for 
an Internet advertising company, with access to the company’s 
business plan, revenue projections, plans for future projects, 
pricing and product strategies, and other various databases with 
information concerning DoubleClick’s clients, among other 
confidential information.198  The defendants had misappropriated 
trade secrets and other confidential information in their 
“surreptitious . . . plot . . . .” to form their own company in direct 
competition with their former employer.199   
Nevertheless, in spite of the defendants’ conduct, the court still 
recognized the employees’ legitimate interest in applying their 
experience to future employment.200 The court found that the 
plaintiff’s proposed injunction, which sought to restrict the 
defendants for “a period of at least twelve months from launching 
a competitive business or from working for a direct competitor of 
DoubleClick, would prevent [defendants] [from] working for such 
a company if it engaged in Internet advertising even as a marginal 
 
 195 Id. 
 196 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 7, 1997). 
 197 In DoubleClick, there was “substantial evidence” that defendants had 
misappropriated their employer’s trade secret information. “Even in the absence of a 
contract restriction, a former employer is not entitled to solicit customers by fraudulent 
means, the use of trade secrets, or confidential information.” Id. at *4 n.2.  In Earthweb, 
Earthweb made no allegation of misappropriation of trade secrets, only that Schlack 
would disclose what he had learned while with the company. 
 198 To illustrate the degree to which the information was intended to be kept 
confidential, some of the misappropriated documents, such as “summaries of operations, 
revenue and expense analyses, [and] analytical summaries of financial indicators,” were 
distributed to DoubleClick’s top managers at the beginning of Board of Directors 
meetings, and then collected at the end so that they would remain confidential. Id. at *2. 
 199 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 309. 
 200 DoubleClick, 1997 WL 731413 at *8. 
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part of its business.”201  Instead, the court ruled that the defendants 
should not be restricted from working for companies that engaged 
in advertising in any media, including the Internet, so long as they 
did not contribute specifically to that company’s Internet 
advertising projects.202 
In addition to limiting the scope of positions from which the 
defendants were restricted, the court in DoubleClick also found 
fault with the duration of the injunction sought by the employer, 
particularly in consideration of the unique characteristics of the 
Internet industry.203  In this respect, the DoubleClick decision was 
the first to raise this matter, and for that reason the case may be 
highly instructive in other cases involving Internet companies, 
such as Earthweb.  “Given the speed with which the Internet 
advertising industry apparently changes, defendants’ knowledge of 
DoubleClick’s operations will likely lose value to such a degree 
that the purpose of a preliminary injunction will have evaporated 
before the year is up.”204 Previously, courts had enforced 
 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 DoubleClick, 1997 WL 731413 at *8. In place of DoubleClick’s suggested 
injunction of twelve months, the court issued an injunction which was to expire six 
months from the date of the opinion, at which point, upon a showing of good cause, 
DoubleClick could move to extend the injunction. The court also formulated the 
injunction so as to confine those businesses found to be “in direct competition” with 
DoubleClick:  
It is hereby ORDERED that, Defendants are enjoined, for a period of six 
months from the date of this opinion, from launching any company, or taking 
employment with any company, which competes with DoubleClick, where 
defendants’ job description(s) or functions at said company or companies 
include providing any advice or information concerning any aspect of 
advertising on the Internet. A company shall be presumed to compete with 
DoubleClick if it provides advertising software, advertising services, or a mix 
of advertising software and advertising services, to any entity seeking to 
advertise on the Internet, or to any website seeking advertisers. Nothing herein 
shall be construed to prevent defendants from working for any employer that 
competes with DoubleClick, so long as defendants’ job description(s) or 
functions with such employer do not include providing advice or information 
concerning any aspect of advertising on the Internet. Defendants are also 
enjoined, for a period of six months from the date of this opinion, from 
providing any advice or information concerning any aspect of advertising on 
the Internet to any third parties who 1) work for defendants’ employer(s), or 2) 
provide or promise to provide any of the defendants with valuable 
consideration for the advice or information, or 3) share or promise to share any 
financial interest with any of the defendants.   
Id. 
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restrictive covenants originally drafted to be in effect for six 
months, while there had been other cases in which a court had 
determined that a proposed year-long agreement was too 
burdensome.  Nevertheless, the court in DoubleClick provides the 
first declaration that, within an entire industry, agreements 
preventing an employee from reentering the market for a single 
year were uniformly unfair.  In certain key aspects, the Internet 
industry and other industries doing business on the Internet 
operated differently from more traditional industries, and 
DoubleClick advanced the notion that the Internet merited certain 
distinct considerations as well. 
Thus, following the decision in DoubleClick, Judge Pauley 
concluded that, due to the particular nature of the Internet industry, 
the no-compete agreement offered by Earthweb to Schlack would 
“fail to pass muster” even if Schlack’s position at ITworld.com fell 
within the provision’s narrow parameters.205  Stating that under 
New York law, a no-compete agreement must be reasonable in 
terms of its scope and duration,206 Pauley reiterated the “powerful 
considerations of public policy which militate against sanctioning 
the loss of a man’s livelihood” and the employer’s entitlement “to 
protection from unfair or illegal conduct that causes economic 
injury.”207  With respect to the duration of the restriction, however, 
the court ruled that a one-year restriction was an excessive period 
to keep an employee from reentering the Internet workforce, 
“given the dynamic nature of this industry, its lack of geographical 
borders, and Schlack’s former cutting-edge position.”208  Citing 
DoubleClick, the court stated that a one-year restriction was 
generally excessive within the Internet industry, “given the speed 
with which the . . . industry changes.”209  Still, the court did not 
follow DoubleClick completely, as it declined to “blue pencil” 
Earthweb’s no-compete agreement to make it reasonable, opting 
instead to disregard it completely. “[R]etroactive alterations distort 
the terms of the employment relationship.”210  Because the 
employment agreement as a whole overreached on Earthweb’s 
behalf, the court decided that it would act on Schlack’s behalf, and 
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decline to enforce the agreement’s terms.211  In perhaps its most 
vivid claim, the court concluded its discussion by declaring that “in 
the Internet environment, a one-year hiatus from the workforce is 
several generations, if not an eternity.”212  Since the enforcement 
of such a restriction in the Internet industry would be 
unreasonable, the court refused to grant the preliminary 
injunction.213  Schlack was free to join ITworld.com. 
III. LESSONS TO LEARN FROM EARTHWEB V. SCHLACK 
In response to the Earthweb decision, several employment 
lawyers began to suggest means by which lawyers and counsel for 
Internet companies should draft employment contracts and no-
compete agreements which would comport with the “new” 
requirements and thereby avoid the problems unearthed in 
Earthweb.214  “The holding in Earthweb that twelve months was 
too long a restrictive period grabbed the attention of employment 
lawyers and in-house counsel, who for years had been advising 
companies that twelve months was a reasonable duration for a 
noncompete,” said one commentator.  “Such advice may still hold 
true in traditional industries, but perhaps not when the client is a 
high-technology company.”215  Practically speaking, it is 
increasingly important after Earthweb that no-compete agreements 
be even more specifically tailored to the needs of the employer and 
the responsibilities of the employee in order to deserve judicial 
enforcement.  While Earthweb is not the first case to stress this 
point, it certainly raises the bar as to how specific agreements must 
be.  “Because most high-tech companies are in a state of continual 
flux, it is often difficult to anticipate the areas in which companies 
will be competing just one year – or even months – ahead of time,” 
said another employment attorney. If the definitions of key 
employment terms aren’t considered thoroughly, companies run 
 
 211 Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 313. 
 212 Id. at 316. 
 213 Id. 
 214 See, e.g., Beverly Garofalo and Mitchell Fishberg, Noncompete Agreements, 
NAT’L. L.J., Jan. 17, 2000 at B7; Jonathan Jacobson, Court Ruling May Herald Next Step 
In Evolution of Restraint of Trade Law, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 20, 1999 at 1; Victoria Cundiff, 
Untangling Earthweb: A Fresh Look at Non-Competes and the Inevitability Doctrine, 
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK 
SERIES, P.L.I., Feb. 2000. 
 215 Garofalo et al., supra note 214. 
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the risk of drafting their agreements too narrowly or too broadly.216  
At the very least, Earthweb demonstrates that standardized, one-
size-fits-all, “boilerplate” no-compete agreements are useless.217 
Another practical consideration to be gleaned from Earthweb is 
that, similar to targeting specific responsibilities or information, 
employers should use no-compete agreements more selectively.  
Although Schlack was a senior executive with the company, the 
court found Earthweb’s no-compete agreement to have been 
applied almost indiscriminately, as Schlack had minimal, if any, 
access to much of the information Earthweb was prohibiting him 
from using.  “Only those employees with actual access to 
proprietary company information should be required to sign them; 
employees who are required to sign noncompetes may take them 
more seriously, knowing that they were among a select group.”218  
Alternatively, “[a] court may question the legitimacy of the 
employer’s purported protectible business interest if every clerk 
and secretary has signed off on the same boilerplate covenant.”219  
As in Earthweb, many technology companies require most 
employees to sign such agreements, since employees may indeed 
be exposed to confidential information at any given time during the 
term of their employment.  Still, such a practice may ultimately 
prove to be counterproductive, and an employer interested in the 
safest means of security might find the effort to be largely 
unenforceable.  In general, after Earthweb, “[t]he fate of the 
thousands of one-year noncompetes already in existence remains to 
be seen.”220 
While certain specific concerns raised by both the Earthweb 
decision and by the practitioners are indeed significant with respect 
to employment law, several assertions promoted within the 
Earthweb decision, coupled with DoubleClick, raise the broader 
issue of conventional law as it relates and is applied to the Internet, 
and to activity which takes place online.  In Earthweb, Judge 
Pauley found certain significant factors inapplicable, criteria 
normally relied upon under the application of New York law to 
traditional industry.  Even in its nascence, the Internet has proven 
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itself to be the source of many legal problems and an ample target 
for criticism from judges and lawyers alike.  Judicial vexation with 
the Internet is widespread, even if judges are simultaneously 
awestruck, as the explosion in Internet use creates an explosion of 
lawsuits involving the Internet.  In a recent domain-name dispute 
case also decided in the Southern District of New York, the court 
expressed its concern over the “knotty,” novel issues raised 
generally by disputes occurring over the Internet: 
Do these online collisions pose new, unique 
difficulties to the law? To what extent do the 
distinct dimensions of the World Wide Web 
challenge the established concepts and methods 
developed to resolve legal conflicts arising from 
other media? Do the familiar approaches suffice to 
accommodate analysis of unaccustomed aspects of 
the new disputes? 221 
 The Internet has been called “a mass medium of communication 
and commerce . . . [and] an incubator of lawsuits,”222 and “a legal 
chimera,” which “bedevils the litigator” through its “dissonant 
union of intellectual property and free speech.”223  Transactions 
taking place over the Internet, and the complications that arise, 
have even been compared to sex: “Although it is usually easy for 
two willing partners to complete a ‘transaction,’ the surrounding 
legal, cultural, and societal issues are dauntingly complex.  Nor is 
there much specialized guidance for electronic merchants beyond 
informal ‘netiquette.’”224  As rapidly as the legal system attempts 
to apply traditional legal principles to the Internet, the Internet 
eludes the law, evolving at an uncontrollable rate, and the disparity 
is as evident as a cavernous hole between where the law is and 
where it needs to be. 
To say that the Internet presents the legal establishment with 
very difficult problems is self-evident; to say precisely how the 
legal establishment should confront the Internet is in itself difficult 
and problematic. Nonetheless, if this Note does not, as it cannot, 
 
 221 Bigstar Entertainment, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 
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propose a legal approach to the Internet, it is clear from indications 
both within and without the legal world that strict application of 
conventional legal principles to the Internet will not work since the 
Internet defies convention.  Many of the rapidly-growing variety of 
cases involving the Internet raise knotty issues, some of them 
novel, yet whether these disputes pose unique difficulties to the 
law, or simply raise a twenty-first century challenge to it, remains 
to be seen.  As one court propounded recently,  “[t]o what extent 
do the distinct dimensions of the World Wide Web challenge the 
established concepts and methods developed to resolve legal 
conflicts arising from other media? Do the familiar approaches 
suffice to accommodate analysis of unaccustomed aspects of the 
new disputes?”225  More often than not, litigators rely on 
conventional wisdom to solve their problems, a strategy which 
may not work, “given the Internet’s defiance of convention and 
wisdom alike.”226 
The history of restrictive covenants and no-compete agreements 
illustrates the notion that, as a result of socioeconomic and 
technological advances, what was once unreasonable is now 
reasonable. Modern society, and the Internet industry as a whole, 
seems to have reached a point where, conversely, what was once 
reasonable is now unreasonable. In addition to Earthweb and 
employment law, the issue of jurisdiction over the Internet, only 
the most preliminary judicial concern, also helps to illustrate the 
ways in which the Internet has confronted traditional law. Modern 
courts have found themselves struggling to articulate new 
standards, apply existing precedent, and educate themselves about 
the technical contours of the World Wide Web.227  The tremendous 
potential for growth and revenue “has begun to test the limits and 
underlying legitimacy of territorial concepts of personal 
jurisdiction.”228  Evoking Judge Pauley’s discussion of the Internet 
in Earthweb, another court found that, unlike federal districts, 
states or other fields, the Internet “has no territorial 
boundaries . . . . [N]ot only is there perhaps ‘no there there,’ the 
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‘there’ is everywhere.”229  The Internet has no territorially-based 
boundaries; the speed and cost of message transmission on the 
Internet “is almost entirely independent of physical location.”230  
The Internet puts significant pressure on jurisdictional analysis 
because “electronics enable a person to achieve a presence in all 
fifty states (or even the entire world) almost immediately from 
anywhere there might be a modem hookup.”231 Again, it is 
important to realize that jurisdiction is only the most preliminary of 
concerns, if one of the more interesting and abstract, raised by the 
Internet. 
In sum, Earthweb provides “a small glimpse of the future.”232  
As businesses and consumers adopt new technologies for 
concluding age-old transactions, they seek comfort in existing 
legal frameworks to determine their rights and obligations. The 
new technologies challenge traditional legal concepts, especially in 
a borderless legal environment where in many instances it remains 
unclear whose laws apply.233  In this “Brave New Economy,” one 
thing is certain: As dot-coms grow up and the Internet comes of 
age, the array of legal issues faced by on-line companies will grow 
ever more complex and numerous.234  At this early point in the 
Internet Revolution, it is accurate, if simplistic, to say that the most 
powerful tool in the dot-com arsenal is an understanding of the 
Internet, and of the technological and social changes it has 
unleashed, in order to navigate, litigate, and legislate the legal 
world of the Internet safely.235 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From its earliest common law origins, the judicial attitude 
towards no-compete agreements has been sensitive to the needs 
and vulnerabilities of employees. In one sense, Earthweb 
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represents only the next step along that path, a case which is 
marginally different, if at all, from those cases which emerged 
during the past several hundred years, long before the Internet, but 
well after the Industrial Revolution and its resultant social and 
legal changes.  From a slightly different angle, however, Earthweb 
simultaneously represents a new wave of cases emerging from an 
entirely new and unprecedented medium, one which has already 
produced social, political and cultural revolutions of its own. 
William Gibson, the science-fiction author and founder of the 
“cyberpunk generation” who was also responsible for coining the 
term “cyberspace,” said of the Internet, 
The Web is new, and our response to it has not yet 
hardened. That is a large part of its appeal. It is 
something half-formed. Larval. It is not what it was 
six months ago; in another six months it will be 
something else again. It was not planned; it simply 
happened, is happening. It is happening the way 
cities happened. It is a city.236 
 The Internet is indeed a city, if not a world, of its own, 
colonizing the “brick and mortar” world at a unprecedented rate. 
The Internet is leading the world into the twenty-first century, and 
it will not stop for the American legal system. Courts must 
recognize that the Internet is unique, and that, increasingly, it must 
be dealt with as unique. 
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